When will we leave Afghanistan?

“…the US army must stay until the Iraqi army is fully ready in 2020.” So says the top US solider in Iraq, Lt. Gen. Babaker Zerbari. He added that the planned withdrawal will create a “problem” and increase instability in Iraq. The US government plans to withdraw its combat troops by the end of August 2010, and to remove all troops by the end of 2011.

This has interesting implications for the US strategy in Afghanistan, where president Obama wants to start troop withdrawal starting July 2011. A year before that deadline, things in the AfPak region are far from stable, unlike in Iraq; this means a slower withdrawal.

Saddam Hussein, undoubtedly, was evil. Nevertheless, Iraq has been a progressive and secular society. It was the only country in the middle-east where one could put up a Christmas tree, and women were not necessitated to don a coverall, not drive or not go to work. While the country was predominantly Muslim, there was a sense of national identity, except for some dissension in the northern province of Kurdistan. Before the US invasion, Iraq had a million-man military, one of the largest in the world at that time.

In contrast, Afghanistan has never really been one nation. Until 1973, when a bloodless coup removed the king Zahir Shah, it was a monarchy. However, this Afghani kingdom only came to be in 1919. Before that it was either a transit for invaders to cross over to India, or was a part of an empire, either Indian or Iranian. During much of the 19th century it was a part of the ‘Great Game‘ between Britain and Russia, which continued even after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, ending when they became allies in WWII.

Without a federal authority, there have been several centers of power around the country throughout Afghanistan’s history; all politics is really local here. The populace is used to continual wars as fortunes have shifted. To complicate matters further, there are the majority (about two-thirds) Pashtuns in the east and south, while the minorities of Uzbeks are in the north and those with Persian heritage occupy the west. And they don’t like each other.

When the Soviets invaded, they had almost as much troops (100,000) as we have now (110,000) and were helped by an equal number of Afghan forces. They stayed there about the same time that we have been (almost 10 years), and when they left in 1989, the whole country was in tatters, without any central governance. Today, the situation is no better than it was two decades ago.

In other words, Afghanistan does not have any central command and control, no feeling of national allegiance and no viable armed forces. It does not have the structure or institutions to become a Westphalian nation-state.

If it will take 10 years for us to leave Iraq in toto, we will be in Afghanistan for a long, long time. Gen. David Petraeus, the US commander in Afghanistan, has started to hedge on that deadline, and VP Biden says US troop withdrawal could be limited. Even president Obama stated that “We didn’t say we’d be switching off the lights and closing the door behind us,” in July 2011!

Reap what you sow?

The Pakistani establishment was full of glee in the 1990s, when they were able to deflect the mujahideen, created with the help of money and expertise from the US, which had helped oust the Russians from Afghanistan, to operate in Kashmir. After having lost the war*, which Pakistan declared on India in 1971, the then Prime Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, declared that it will “bleed India with a thousand cuts”.

Pakistan had deemed that with this ‘proxy’ war it will kill many birds with one stone. It will have deniability of waging a war, and the battle hardened mujahideen will bleed enough of India’s vastly superior armed forces (Pakistan was not yet a nuclear power; it became one in 1998) so they don’t pose a threat to Pakistan. The ensuing mayhem, they felt, would also keep India occupied enough to slow its advance to become a regional superpower. For them, it was a win-win situation.

Pakistan had thought that it could carry on this third-party guerilla warfare forever, or until it is able to wrest Kashmir from India, after having lost three wars it started for this purpose.

However, every action has unintended consequences as well. Nobody foresaw 9/11, and how it would change the whole geo-political dynamic. Pakistan had to make a u-turn in its support for the Afghani Taliban at American behest, and rein it many terrorist outfits that had linkages with al Qaeda and were having international ambitions although they were supposed to operate exclusively in Kashmir.

This created a backlash which progressed rather unchecked. The Pakistani establishment was unable to stem their activities since it had nurtured them for years, and had indoctrinated the population that India is a mortal threat, and that the use of violent methods to achieve goals in the name of Islam are legitimate. Little did they realize that these terrorists will bite the hand that fed them, and create anarchy in the Land of the Pure itself.

There have been reports of another vengeful group emerging in Pakistan, the Ghazi Force. Unlike many other Pakistan-based terror groups, the targets of this band is solely within the country. Suicide bombers have recently attacked a Sufi shrine in Lahore, because these extremists consider the orthodox strain of Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia, Wahabism, as the only true face of the religion. And no surprise, Pakistanis are blaming the US after this shrine attack, because America is “killing muslims” all over the world.


*Mr. Bhutto’s vow was to avenge the re-partition of Pakistan by the creation of Bangladesh. That India’s involvement was mainly because of millions of refugees from ‘East’ Pakistan crossing the border and creating chaos, and that Pakistan had itself declared the war, was summarily forgotten.

It was also overlooked that the one of the  reasons of dissent in that wing of Pakistan was the denial of the ‘West’ Pakistani establishment to honor the election of Mujibur Rehman, an ‘East’ Pakistani whose party had won the majority of seats in the Parliament in the 1971 general election, making him eligible to become the Prime Minister of Pakistan, both ‘East’ and ‘West’.

Another reason was the coercion of the Bengali speaking populace of the ‘East’ to only use Urdu, a North Indian language, as their lingua franca, and systemic assaults of their distinctive culture. The ‘East’ Pakistanis were growing tired of constant intimidation and oppression meted out by the ‘West’.

Apparently, religion (read Islam) was not a strong enough glue to hold them together, as it had been the supposed reason for Partition from India.

These fractures are visible even in the current day Pakistan, where Baluchis and Sindhis rebel against hegemony from Punjabis. One of the four provinces, Punjab is the most populous and dominant, and Punjabis still command the upper echelons of power in the establishment, including the armed forces. These disturbances were ignored until they started happening in Punjab itself, by outfits like the Pakistani Taliban and now the Ghazi Force.

Chicago Style?

In a brilliant masterstroke, President Obama replaced Gen. McChrystal with Gen. Petraeus, without opening himself to the criticism of derailing the war effort in Afghanistan. There has been bipartisan, as well as international, praise for this pick.

Another pick Mr. Obama made was similarly lauded. When he picked Mrs. Clinton as the Secretary of State, media pundits opined he was building ‘a team of rivals’, just as Abraham Lincoln did. However, there were some cynics who floated the idea that it was Mr. Obama’s way of sidelining Mrs. Clinton from presidential politics so that she doesn’t mount a challenge to him in 2012.

The cynic in me thinks that it could be the same reason to send Gen. Petraeus over to Afghanistan. It appears that he does harbor political ambitions and his star is rising among many Republicans who seem to be frustrated at the direction their party is taking as they head towards another presidential showdown in the next two years, and the fact that there seems to be no viable name to challenge Mr. Obama in his reelection bid.

Prospective challengers to the President will have to start their campaign sometime in mid 2011 and get in line to battle in their party’s primaries. Latecomers do not stand much chance, as the attempt by Mr. Fred Thompson discovered even though he had an impressive name recognition by playing as a DA in the ubiquitous show, Law & Order.

Mr. Obama has set July 2011 as the date of the drawing down of forces from Afghanistan. However, it does not mean that the war there will come to an end. There will certainly be some withdrawal of forces, a regiment or a brigade or two next July, but we will be in Afghanistan for a long, long time. And so will Gen. Petraeus, at least for another year or two, way past the time he can effectively challenge his current Commander-in-Chief.

I can imagine what a dilemma it would have been for the General when the offer to lead forces in Afghanistan, which, strictly speaking, was a demotion for him since he was heading the Central Command that includes several other countries besides Afghanistan. If he indeed had presidential hopes and had said no, it would have been conveniently ‘leaked’ to the media that the General is putting his political ambitions above his duty to the country. This would have killed his prospects even before they had taken off.

Isn’t this another brilliant masterstroke?

If my thinking is correct, Mr. Obama killed two birds with one stone!

Beauty is in the eye of the beholder?

Pakistanis have been suggesting that the US should talk to the Taliban, otherwise the US strategy will fail, and Mr. Obama seems to agree. The Defense Secrataty, Mr. Gates, believes that you cannot say that one Taliban is good, and the other not good, but agrees with his boss that there is a need to talk to some Taliban commanders.

Pakistan has nurtured the Afghan Taliban since its inception, and in fact the Pakistani military’s secret service, the ISI, created it and helped it take over Afghanistan as a ‘strategic depth’ against India. Although tables turned after 9/11, the Government of Pakistan admits it is reaching out to them at all levels. It is the Pakistani Taliban that Pakistanis want to root out, because they are causing mayhem within their borders; they are the ‘bad’ Taliban, according to them.

I think talking to any Taliban would be a bad idea, and would only foster more terrorism. On the other hand, the US should encourage other countries in the region, like India – which has sunk $1.2 billion so far, to continue to assist in building Afghani infrastructure. After all, Afghanistan needs all the help it can get, especially now that we know that it has over $1 trillion worth of untapped natural reserves.


Land of the impure?

Fareed Zakaria of Newsweek explains why Pakistan keeps exporting jihad, and is a terrorism supermarket. He traces the beginnings of this culture shortly after the birth of this nation over 60 years ago*, and quotes the book written by the current Pakistani ambassador to the US, Mr. Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military.

Mr. Zakaria alludes to the classification of Taliban by the Pakistani military as good and bad. The good Taliban attacks Westerners, Afghans and Indians, but spare Pakistanis. The bad Taliban attack Pakistan, and the Pakistani Army has tried to smoke them out of their hideouts in South Waziristan.

The US and its allies have been prodding the Pakistani Armed Forces to launch similar offensives in North Waziristan, but is faced with countless excuses why it is not a right time to do so. Perhaps the real reason is that this area is home to the ‘good’ Taliban, as seen by the Pakistani Army.

A study published by the London School of Economics claims that Pakistan is Funding and training Taliban in Afghanistan. Of course, the Government and the Army of Pakistan deny it, but apparantly a senior official admits to militancy’s deep roots in Pakistan.


*The raison d’être of Pakistan since 1947, when it was partitioned from India, was a ‘two-nation’ theory, which expounds that Hindus and Muslims are two separate cultures that cannot live together peacefully. This theorem was busted in 1971 with the formation of Bangladesh, when it became evident that the glue to unity was something other than religion. Six decades later, it seems that Pakistan is still having an identity crisis, as explained by Ali Sethi in a NY Times op-ed piece, One Myth, Many Pakistans.